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DEMOTED TO HIGH SCHOOL:
ARE COLLEGE STUDENTS' FREE SPEECH
RIGHTS THE SAME AS THOSE OF HIGH
SCHOOL STUDENTS?
Abstract: The First Amendment guarantees significant rights to free
speech and expression for students of all ages. These rights have been
limited, however, by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Hazelwood
School District v. KuNattier that school officials can regulate the style and
content of school-sponsored student speech in ways that are "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Since then, lower courts have
relied on Hazelwood to uphold censorship of student speech in
elementary and secondary school, including restrictions based on the
speaker's viewpoint. Recent cases have extended this analysis to the
university context by upholding acts of censorship under Hazelwood's
reasonableness standard. This Note argues that university officials should
not be given the same level of deference as secondary school officials
when regulating student speech. The "material and substantial
disruption" test currently provides the most appropriate framework for
balancing the competing interests in favor of protecting university
students' speech rights.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, students of all ages have enjoyed significant speech
rights under the First Amendment, allowing them to express their
views freely. 1 In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court said, "[i] t can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 2 Despite
these guarantees, the Court significantly limited high school students'
speech rights two decades later.' In 1988, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, the Court held that high school faculty could restrict the
style and content of "school-sponsored" student speech, as long as the
regulations were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
3 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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cerns."4
 The Court gave substantial deference to school officials' deci-
sions regarding the content of school-sponsored speech because the
school could be viewed as endorsing this type of speech. 5
 Since then,
federal courts have relied on Hazelwood to uphold acts of censorship
at the elementary and secondary school levels.° Courts have dis-
agreed, however, on the appropriate standard for reviewing alleged
violations of university students' free speech rights.?
In 2002, in Brown v. Li, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that a university committee could
withhold approval of a graduate student's thesis because of objection-
able content without violating his First Amendment rights. 8 The court
focused on whether the thesis committee's actions constituted im-
permissible acts of censorship when it refused to approve the content
of the thesis's "Acknowledgments" section.° This section of Christo-
pher Brown's thesis, entitled "Disacknowledgernents," criticized the
school's administration." The Ninth Circuit judges disagreed over the
applicable standard for reviewing the committee's decision." Only
one of the three judges adopted Hazelwood's framework for analyzing
the case," whereas another judge criticized this approach."
The U.S. Supreme Court had refrained from deciding in Hazel-
wood whether courts should give university officials the same degree of
deference as high school principals." Nevertheless, Judge Susan Gra-
ber, the author of the Brown decision, relied on Hazelwood's reason-
ableness test because the judges could not identify a more appropri-
ate standard for reviewing the thesis committee's decision." Before
Brown, only one other federal appellate court had applied the defer-
ential Hazelwood standard to uphold a university official's act of cen-
4 Id.
5 See id. at 271.
6 See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 929, 934 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003) (mem.); Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. V,
Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane).
7
 Compare Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood's reason-
ableness test), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1488 (2003) (mem.), with Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d
342, 354 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Kincaid II) (applying strict scrutiny).
a 308 F.3d at 952.
Id. at 947.
la Id. at 943.
"Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12 Id. at 949 (Graber, J.).
13 Brown, 308 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14 484 U.S. at 273 n.7.
23 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 947.
2003]	 Free Speech Rights of College Students 	 175
sorship. 16 In 1999, in Kincaid v. Gibson ("Kincaid 1"), a panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the university
yearbook was a school-sponsored expressive activity and university
officials could regulate its content in any reasonable manner." The en
bane court subsequently reversed this decision on the basis that the
university's actions should be reviewed with greater scrutiny than Ha-
zelwood's reasonableness test. 18 The circuit court decisions in Brown
and Kincaid I raise the issue of what standard a court should apply
when reviewing censorship in the university context."
This Note examines the standards that courts employ to deter-
mine students' First Amendment rights at the secondary and post-
secondary educational levels. 24 Although other commentators have
• argued against the application of Hazelwood to the university context,
this Note extends their analyses by exploring several alternative stan-
dards to guide, future courts' decisions. 21 Part I outlines students' First
Amendment rights prior to the Hazelwood decision.22 Part II discusses
the Hazelwood opinion and its impact on students' rights to free
speech in elementary and secondary schools. 25 Part III reviews the
application of the Hazelwood standard to students' First Amendment
rights in the public university setting.24 Part IV argues that, because
high school and college learning environments differ significantly,
Hazelwood's reasonableness test does not give sufficient consideration
to college and university students' speech rights.25 Finally, Part V pres-
ents several alternative approaches to resolving these cases and rec-
ommends that future courts balance the relevant interests in favor of
preserving students' free speech rights. 26
16 Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719,726 (6th Cir, 1999) (Kincaid I), trIt'g en bane granted
and vacated by 197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd and remanded en bane Kincaid g 236 F.3d 342.
17 191 F.3d at 728.
18 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 346.
16 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 947; Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 346.
28 See infra notes 27-200 and accompanying text.
21 See George C. Lisby, Resolving the Hazelwood Conundrum: The First Amendment Rights
of College Students in Kincaid v. Gibson and Beyond, 7 Comm. L. & Pot:v 129,155-56 (2002);
Richard J. Peitz, Censorship Thinami Spares College Media: To Protect Free Expression on Public
Campuses, Lessons from the 'College Hazelwood "Case, 68 TENN. L. REV, 981,533 (2001); Mark
J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the "Marketplace of Ideas": The Case Against Extending Hazel-
wood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1915,1948 (2002).
" See infra notes 27-50 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 51-110 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 111-200 and accompanying text.
25 See iufra notes 201-233 and accompanying text.
45
 See infra notes 234-289 and accompanying text.
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I. STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS PRIOR TO HAZELWOOD
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. KUHLMEIER
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District's
Material and Substantial Disruption Test
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court granted extensive First Amend-
ment rights to students in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, now known as the "black-armband case. " 27 In Tinker, jun-
ior high and high school students wore black armbands to school as a
protest of the Vietnam War. 29
 The school principals suspended these
students for violating a school district policy, adopted several days ear-
lier, which prohibited students from wearing armbands to schoo1. 29 The
Court viewed the students' form of expression as "akin to 'pure
speech,'" which directly invoked First Amendment protections, con-
trasting it with disruptive speech or group demonstrations." Although
recognizing that school officials have the authority to regulate student
conduct in the school, the Court determined that the students in this
case were being punished for a peaceful protest that did not interfere
with the work of the school or intrude on the rights of other students."
Thus, the Court concluded that the policy violated the students' First
Amendment rights."
In Tinker, the Court held that the school could only censor stu-
dent expressions of opinion that would "'materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the op-
eration of the school.'"" This "material and substantial disruption"
test attempted to balance the First Amendment rights of students
against the needs of school officials to maintain order." As a result,
school officials were required to prove more than just an unsupported
fear or apprehension that the students' expression might cause a dis-
turbance." Applying this test, the Court affirmed the students' right
27
 See 393 U.S. 503, 511-14 (1969).
28 Id. at 504.
28 Id.
50 Id. at 508.
si Id.
32 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
33 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside V. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
m See id. at 506-07.
" Id. at 508.
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to wear black armbands to school because their actions did not create
a disturbance in the schoo1. 36
The Court did not limit its holding to speech that occurs within
the confines of a classroom discussion. 37 The Court stated that commu-
nication among students is not only inevitable, "it is also an important
part. of the educational process."" Therefore, students' First Amendment
rights must be protected during curricular and extracurricular activities
that occur on school grounds, as long as those activities do not substan-
tially disturb the functioning of the school or invade the rights of other
students."
In affirming the students' rights to free expression, the Court
also noted that the ban against black armbands singled out one par-
ticular symbol (worn to express a political viewpoint), whereas the
school permitted students to wear other symbols (such as buttons re-
lating to political campaigns)• 40 This type of viewpoint discrimination
is unconstitutional under the Court's established First Amendment
doctrine and is not permitted in any forum for public speech. 41
B. Narrowing of Students' Free Speech Rights
Despite the Court's strong protection of -students' free speech
rights in Tinker, the Court subsequently limited these rights when it
balanced them against the state's significant interest in "teaching stu-
dents ... socially appropriate behavior." 12 In 1986, in Bethel School Dis-
trict No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court upheld the suspension of a high
school student for making sexually suggestive statements at a school
assembly. 43 Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, dis-
tinguished Matthew N. Fraser's sexually explicit and offensive speech
se Id. at 509.
37 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
3a Id.
" See id. at 512-13.
40 Id. at 510-11.•
41 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S, 37,46 (1983); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector Sc Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,828-29 (1995) (stating Tit
is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content
or the message it conveys.... When the government targets not subject matter, but par-
ticular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the
more blatant").
42 Bethel Sch. Dist. No, 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 6'75,681 (1986); see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
43
 478 U.S. at 685. Although the majority characterized Matthew N. Fraser's speech as
"lewd," "vulgar," and "offensive," id. at 683, Justice Brennan noted that Fraser did not use
any obscene language that would remove his speech from First Amendment protection, id.
at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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during a school assembly from Tinker's "nondisruptive, passive expres-
sion of a political viewpoint" because Fraser's speech intruded on the
work of the school and the rights of the other students." Whereas
Tinker was punished for a peaceful expression of his viewpoint, Fraser
was punished for using sexually explicit speech that the Court found
inappropriate in a school setting.45
Although the Court did not explicitly overrule Tinker's material
and substantial disruption test, it held that the school could prohibit
inappropriate modes of expression (including offensive speech) with-
out proving that the speech created disruption in the school. 46 The
Court thus adopted a balancing test that permitted school officials to
regulate student speech in order to achieve the school's educational
mission, stating that "Wile undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular
and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced
against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."47.
 The Court noted that,
even though schools must tolerate divergent political or religious views,
educators also have an interest in teaching students to be sensitive to
others. 48
 Applying these principles to the facts of Fraser's case, the
Court concluded that the principal's actions appropriately furthered
the school's interest in disassociating itself from "vulgar speech and
lewd conduct [that] is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental val-
ues' of public school education." 49 The Fraser decision thus marked a
change in the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to students' First
Amendment rights because it granted significant deference to school
officials' decisions concerning appropriate behavior in the public
school environment. 5°
II. HAZELIVOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT V. KUHLMEIER'S "LEGITIMATE
PEDAGOGICAL CONCERNS" TEST
In 1988, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the U.S. Supreme
Court adopted a new, more deferential standard that now governs
most school regulations of student expression." In Hazelwood, student
44 Id. at 680.
45 See id. at 685.
46 /d. at 683.
47 Id. at 681.
48 Rater, 478 U.S. at 681.
46
 Id. at 685-86.
5° See id. at 683; see also Peitz, supra note 21, at 491.
5t
 See 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
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staff members of the high school newspaper, Spectrum, argued that the
school principal violated their free speech rights when he removed
articles dealing with controversial topics, such as teenage pregnancy
and divorce, from the newspaper." In 1985, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Missouri upheld the principal's actions because the
court determined that the newspaper was not a public forum and the
principal had reasonable concerns about the appropriateness of the
topics and the students' anonymity," In 1986, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, characterizing the school news-
paper as a public forum and applying Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District's material and substantial disruption test to
the facts of the case." The circuit court held that the principal had
violated the students' First Amendment rights because there was in-
sufficient evidence that publication of the articles would create dis-
ruption in the school or invade the rights of others. 55
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's decision and
adopted a new standard for reviewing restrictions on student speech
in the school setting." Quoting Tinker and Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser; the Court acknowledged that students retain constitutional
rights to free speech and expression, however, these rights may be
limited in light of the school's special environment and educational
mission.57 Accordingly, the Court considered the characteristics of the
forum in which the speech occurred (Spectrum was produced in Jour-
nalism class) and the nature of the speech contained within the cen-
sored articles." The Court then reviewed the principal's decision to
determine whether it was an appropriate means of preserving the
students' rights while maintaining control over the schoo1. 59
A. Public Forum Analysis
First, the Court analyzed the nature of the forum involved be-
cause courts scrutinize restrictions on speech more closely in truly
52 Id. at 262-63,
BS Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1466 (D. Mo. 1985), tru'd, 795
F.2d 1368 (8th Cir, 1986), reu'd and remanded, 484 U.S. 260.
54 See Hazelwood, 795 F.2d at 1373-74.
55 See id. at 1375-76.
56 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266, 273.
32 Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) and
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503.506 (1969)).
58 Id. at 267-72 (analyzing first the nature of the forum, then the type of speech).
59 Id. at 274-76.
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public areas. 60
 Traditionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
three types of public fora: (1) the traditional public forum, which the
public generally views as available for free speech and assembly (such
as a public street or park); (2) the limited public forum, which is
opened to public speech for a limited time or purpose; and (3) the
nonpublic forum, which is government property that is not open for
public communication. 61
In a traditional public forum, the state may regulate the time,
place, and manner of speech, but content-based restrictions on
speech are rarely permitted. 62 Courts strictly scrutinize content-based
regulations of speech in a traditional public forum because courts
traditionally recognize this type of forum as a venue for public assem-
bly and free expression.° To survive strict scrutiny, the state must
show that any content-based regulation in a traditional public forum
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve this purpose." Likewise, when a limited public forum
is opened to the public for a specific purpose or time frame, any gov-
ernment restriction on speech is reviewed with strict scrutiny. 65
In contrast, the state may reserve a nonpublic forum for a specific
purpose, as long as any regulation on speech is reasonable and is not
intended to suppress the speaker's viewpoint. 66
 The Court has analyzed
the reasonableness of a government restriction on speech based on the
purpose of the forum and "all the surrounding circumstances." 67 The
government's actions in limiting access to a nonpublic forum do not
need to be the most or only reasonable restrictions available.°
Public schools generally are not considered open to the public
for free speech and assembly, and thus are not considered traditional
public fora.° For a public school to be considered a limited or non-
public forum, there must be some evidence that school officials have
60
 Sec id. at 267; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983).
61 See. e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. Some courts refer to a limited public forum as a
"designated" public forum when the forum has been reserved for speech pertaining to a
designated subject or purpose. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 803 (1985) (referring to this type of forum as a "public forum by designation").
62 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
63 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
84 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
65 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; see Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
66
 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
67 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
sa !d. at 808.
09 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
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opened the facilities, through policy or practice, for use by some seg-
ment of the public (such as student organizations) to freely engage in
expressive activity."
Regarding the Hazelwood school newspaper, the Court found in-
sufficient evidence to indicate that school officials intended to create a
traditional or limited public forum." Instead, the Court determined
that Spectrum was a nonpublic forum because school officials retained
significant control over its publication and its production occurred in
conjunction with the school's journalism classes," Ultimately, the Court
concluded that the school intended the newspaper to be a "supervised
learning experience for journalism students," rather than a forum
available for indiscriminate use by members of the public." Thus, the
school could impose content-based restrictions on speech based on
reasonable objectives. 74
B. Regulation of School-Sponsored Speech
Next, the Court reviewed the nature of the speech at issue in Ha-
zelwood to determine whether the school officials' actions were rea-
sonable. 75 The Court drew a distinction between the "personal expres-
sion" of students and student speech that is "school-sponsored."78
Members of the public may view school-sponsored speech as bearing
the "imprimatur" of the school, and thus the school must be able to
disassociate itself from speech that it finds inappropriate. 77 Although
the First Amendment requires schools to tolerate pure student speech
that happens to take place on school property, schools can exercise
greater control over school-sponsored expressive activities, such as a
school newspaper, because the public is likely to view the school as
promoting this type of speech. 78
The Court held that restrictions on the style and content of stu-
dent speech in school-sponsored expressive activities must only be "rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns" to preserve mu-
78 Id.
71
 Id. at 270.
72 See id. at 268, 270.
75 Id. at 270.
74 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
78 See id. at 270-72.
76 Id. at 271.
77 Id,
78 See id.
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dents' First Amendment rights." In articulating this standard, the
Court stated that school officials are entitled to substantial deference
because they have primary responsibility in our society for educating
the nation's youth.8° Although the Court extensively discussed the
emotional maturity of the intended audience as a reason for granting
schools this level of deference, it did not limit its holding to the ele-
mentary or secondary school setting.m Instead, the Court left open
the issue of whether the same standard should apply to post-
secondary education. 82
Finally, the Court deemed the Hazelwood school officials' actions
reasonable in light of the legitimate pedagogical goals served by those
actions.83
 Those legitimate goals included the protection of students'
and parents' privacy and the maintenance of journalism standards for
the treatment of controversial issues. 84
 The school principal could
have reasonably decided that "frank talk" about sex, pregnancy, and
birth control was inappropriate in a school-sponsored publication dis-
tributed to high school freshmen and possibly taken home and read
by the students' younger siblings.85 Thus, the principal's decision to
remove the articles from the-school newspaper did not violate the
student writers' free speech rights. 86
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice William Brennan, joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall
and Harry Blackmun, wrote a dissenting opinion that would have ap-
plied Tinker's material and substantial disruption test to show the
school impermissibly infringed upon the students' free speech rights. 87
Justice Brennan found that the students' speech did not disrupt class-
room activity or invade the rights of others, and the principal could
78 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. For the view that the Hazelwood standard does not change
the test for reasonableness in a nonpublic forum, but rather is merely an application of
that standard to the public school setting, see Seareey v. Harris. 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th
Cir. 1989).
8° See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
81 See id. at 272, 273 n.7.
82 Id. at 27311.7 (stating "Me need not now decide whether the same degree of defer-
ence is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and
university level").
83 See id. at 276.
84 Id.
88 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274-75.
86 Id. at 276.
87 Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Tinker, 393 US. at 509.
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have taken other steps to dissociate the students' speech from the
school without excising the articles in their entirety." Thus, Justice
Brennan concluded that the school principal had violated the stu-
dents' First Amendment rights when he removed the articles from the
school newspaper. 89
Rejecting the majority's attempt to create a new First Amend-
ment standard, Justice Brennan argued that Tinker struck the proper
balance between school officials' interests in maintaining order and
the students' right to freely express views that might conflict with
those of the school." Although acknowledging that the Hazelwood ma-
jority did not overrule Tinker, Justice Brennan argued that the major-
ity created a "taxonomy of school censorship" by inappropriately dis-
tinguishing between personal and school-sponsored speech. 91 Noting
that the Tinker and Fraser courts did not draw such a distinction, Jus-
tice Brennan argued that the Tinker standard should apply regardless
of whether the student's speech is "school-sponsored." 92 Thus, the Ha-
zelwood majority should have applied the material and substantial dis-
ruption test to decide the case 9s
D. Federal Court Decisions Since Hazelwood
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's Hazelwood decision in 1988, lower
courts have consistently applied the "legitimate pedagogical concerns"
test to allow elementary and secondary schools to restrict students' and
teachers' expression in a variety of "school-sponsored" contexts.94 The
circuit courts have disagreed, however, on the extent to which schools
can regulate speech based on the particular viewpoint expressed."
ea Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
ea See id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
B0 See id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 281-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
es See 484 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a school
committee may regulate a teacher's classroom speech if the Hazelwood test is met and the
teacher has notice of what conduct is prohibited); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762-64
(6th Cir. 1989) (upholding disqualification of a high school student from school elections
because the student criticized the school administration in a campaign speech).
See, e.g., C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 1999), rehg en banc granted and va-
cated b' 197 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd en bane by an equally divided court, 226 F.3d 198 (3d
Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Din., 941 F.2d 817,
829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d
918, 926 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing circuit split over viewpoint discrimination by school
• officials), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003) (mem.).
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Traditionally, viewpoint discrimination has been considered a particu-
larly objectionable form of content discrimination. 96
 Whereas content-
based restrictions on speech may be permissible in light of the forum's
purpose, viewpoint-based regulations impermissibly target speech be-
cause of the speaker's ideology, opinion, or perspective. 97
In nonpublic forum decisions prior to Hazelwood, the U.S. Su-
preme Court had held that the government, when regulating speech
based on content, could not suppress speech based on the speaker's
viewpoint 98
 The Court did not specifically address this issue in Hazel-
wood, but instead deferred to public school officials' discretion in
making decisions about the school curriculum.° As a result, the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits have con-
cluded that, under Hazelwood, viewpoint discrimination is permissible
in the public school setting. 1 °° In contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that viewpoint dis-
crimination is impermissible in any type of government forum, even a
nonpublic forum like a public schoo1. 101
In 2002, in Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R
-1, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit discussed this circuit split con-
cerning viewpoint discrimination. 102
 The case involved a mosaic created
by students and members of the community at Columbine High School
after the 1999 shootings at the school. 105
 The school district designed
the mosaic as a project for rebuilding the school, not as a memorial
commemorating the tragic shootings. 1 °4 Consequently, school adminis-
trators removed tiles that did not meet the guidelines for the project,
including any tiles that contained references to the shooting.'°5
In deciding whether this act of censorship constituted impermis-
sible viewpoint discrimination, the court analyzed the U.S. Supreme
Court's reasoning in Hazelwood and reviewed the holdings of other
"Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,829 (1995).
97 Id. at 829-30.
" Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
99 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
100 See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 926; C.H., 195 F.3d at 172; Ward, 996 F.2d at 454. For an ar-
gument supporting this view, see janna J. Annest, Note and Comment, Only the News That's
Fit to Print: The Effect of Hazelwood on the First Amendment Viewpoint•Neutrality Requirement in
Public School-Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227,1258-59 (2002).
1 ° 1 See Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 829; Searcy, 888 F.2d at 1325.
102 See 298 F.3d at 926.
195 Id. at 920-21.
104 Id. at 921.
tos Id. at 921-22.
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circuit courts regarding viewpoint discrimination,' 06 Judge David Ebel
reasoned that the Hazelwood Court did not intend to "simply repeat
the traditional nonpublic forum analysis in school cases" when the
Court articulated the legitimate pedagogical concerns test.'" In light
of the special emphasis placed on the school's right to control speech
that bears the imprimatur of the school, the Fleming court concluded
that Hazelwood does not require that restrictions on school-sponsored
speech be viewpoint neutral." 8 The court then applied the Hazelwood
standard to the facts of the case and held that the school district's
guidelines for the mosaic were reasonably related to the legitimate
pedagogical concerns articulated for the project. 1" The Tenth Circuit
thus endorsed the view that students' speech could be restricted based
on the viewpoint expressed, a level of censorship not permitted even
in the typical nonpublic forum.''°
M. REGULATION OF STUDENT SPEECH AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
Although the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide
whether the Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier standard should apply
at the university level, scholars predicted that the Court would not ex-
tend its deferential reasoning to the university context based on prior
First Amendment jurisprudence." College students generally enjoy the
same First Amendment protections as those of the general public." 2
The.Court has long recognized that "[t] he college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.'"" 3 The
recent federal appellate court decisions in Kincaid v. Gibson ("Kincaid I")
and Brown v. Li thus represent significant departures from the Court's
traditional free speech doctrine as applied to the university setting. 114
We See id. at 926-28.
107 See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 926.
11111 See id. at 928.
1°9 See id. at 934.
110 See id, at 926; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
"I See Peitz, supra note 21, at 509; see, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
112 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (stating, the precedents of this Court leave no room for the
view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large").
111 Id.
114 See Brown v Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1488 (2003)
(mem.); Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 726 (6th Cir, 1999) (Kincaid I), rehg en bane
granted and vacated by 197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd and remanded en bane, 236 F.3d 342
(6th Cir. 2001) (Kincaid II).
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A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District Applied to the University Setting
Prior to Hazelwood, the U.S. Supreme Court protected university
students' First Amendment rights against the competing interests of
university officials.'" For example, in 1972, the Court affirmed col-
lege students' First Amendment rights to free expression and associa-
tion in Healy v. James, when Central Connecticut State College officials
refused to recognize a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic
Society organization." 6
 Non-recognition barred the student group
from accessing campus facilities, including meeting rooms, bulletin
boards, and the school newspaper." 7
 The Court held that the students
had a cognizable First Amendment interest in obtaining official rec-
ognition because the university's decision impacted the students' abil-
ity to assemble and speak as a group.'" Thus, the college was required
to prove that it had an acceptable reason for denying recognition to
the student group in order to avoid a First Amendment violation." 9
College officials asserted several reasons for the decision, includ-
ing concern over the student group's affiliation with a controversial
national organization and disagreement with the national organiza-
tion's philosophies. 120
 The Court determined that disagreement with
the groups' philosophies or views was not a sufficient reason for deny-
ing recognition. 12' The school's decision would be permissible, how-
ever, if school officials could show that the group's activities were di-
rected at inciting or producing "lawless action" or substantially disrupt-
ing the school environment. 122 Evidence that the group intended to
violate reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially inter-
fere with the rights of other students would indicate that the students
intended to disrupt the campus environment)" The Court concluded
that college officials could not limit the student group's right to free
association and expression on campus unless there was sufficient evi-
1 " See, e.g., Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973);
Healy, 408 U.S. at 184.
116 408 U.S. at 172, 194.
117 Id. at 176.
118 1d. at 184.
119 See id.
128 Id. at 185-87.
121 Healy, 408 U.S. at 187-88.
122 Id. at 189 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969)).
129 ard:
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dente to show that the students would not comply with reasonable
school regulations. 124
B. Application of Hazelwood to University Extracunicular Activities
In 1999, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
first applied the Hazelwood standard to the acts of a public university
official in Kincaid I, affirming the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky's grant of summary judgment to university
officials who banned distribution of the Kentucky State University
1992-1994 yearbook. 125 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, subsequently reversed the panel's decision in
Kincaid v. Gibson ("Kincaid II") because the university's actions were
not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.'"
1. University Newspaper as a Nonpublic Forum
In Kincaid I, university students maintained that school officials
violated their rights to free speech by confiscating the student year-
book because of its content. 127 Following the structure of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's analysis in Hazelwood, the Sixth Circuit panel first ad-
dressed whether the university yearbook constituted a public fo-
rum. 129 The court looked for evidence of the university's intent in
order to determine whether the yearbook should be characterized as
a public forum or a nonpublic forum. 129 The panel distinguished the
university yearbook from the student newspaper in Hazelwood because
the yearbook was not produced as part of a classroom activity and
Betty Gibson, as Vice President of Student Affairs, exercised less con-
trol over the yearbook than the high school principal exercised over
the Hazelwood newspaper.'" Although the panel distinguished the two
publications, it found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that
the university intended the yearbook to serve as a public forum, so
124 Id. at 194.
126 See Kincaid I, 191 F.3d at 721. The yearbook covered two years of campus life, Id. at 723.
126 236 F.3d at 344.
127 191 F.3d at 724.
128 Id. at 727-28.
129 Id. at 727; see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988). In a
footnote, the panel recognized that a school publication may not be considered a tradi-
tional public forum, but may constitute a limited or designated public forum entitled to
full protection under the First Amendment. See Kincaid 1, 191 F.3d at 727 n.3.
I" See Kincaid I, 191 F.3d at 727.
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the yearbook must be considered a nonpublic forum."' Thus, the
panel applied Hazelwood's reasonableness standard for a school-
sponsored activity in a nonpublic forum.'"
Addressing Gibson's actions under the Hazelwood standard, the
panel stated that confiscation of the yearbook "was reasonable in light
of the yearbook's failure to accomplish its intended purpose."
School officials gave several reasons for confiscating the yearbook,
including its purple cover (which did not reflect the university's col-
ors), the ambiguous theme and title ("Destination Unknown"), the
lack of captions under pictures, and the inclusion of pictures of cur-
rent events and public figures. 134
 Even though the students argued
that other options were available to school officials besides
confiscation, the panel held that Gibson's decision was reasonable
"kin light of the undisputedly poor quality of the yearbook," and did
not need to be the "most reasonable" option.'"
Additionally, the panel addressed the students' contention that
the university's stated reason for confiscating the yearbook was a pre-
text for its true reason for confiscation: disapproval of the yearbook's
message.'" Although the panel acknowledged that viewpoint dis-
crimination is impermissible even in a nonpublic forum, it found in-
sufficient evidence to suggest that Gibson's actions were viewpoint-
based."7
 The court concluded that the yearbook did not convey a par-
ticular message, and although Gibson testified that she did not under-
stand the theme, "Destination Unknown," this statement did not sug-
gest an intent to suppress the students' views.'" Thus, Gibson's deci-
sion was a permissible, content-based regulation of speech that did
not constitute viewpoint discrimination. 139
In his partial dissent, Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. disagreed with the
panel's decision to apply the Hazelwood standard to a university set-
ting."' Although Judge Cole agreed that the yearbook was not a tradi-
tional public forum, he argued that the majority ignored the possibility
131 See id. at 728.
is2
'LI Id. at 729.
134
 hi. at 723.
155 Kincaid 4 191 F.3d at 729.




' 4° Kincaid I, 191 F.3d at 730 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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that it was a limited public forum."' If the university intended the
yearbook to be a limited public forum, then any restrictions on speech
would have to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest
in order to survive strict scrutiny. 142 Judge Cole also noted that the rea-
sons for affording deference to school officials are less compelling at
the university level because college students are more mature than high
school students, with most having reached the age of majority. 143
2. University Newspaper as a Limited Public Forum •
In the en banc decision, the Sixth Circuit held that the yearbook
was a limited public forum and applied strict scrutiny review. 144 Judge
Cole, who dissented in part in Kincaid I, wrote the decision for the
court. 143 Judge Cole began his opinion by analyzing the type of public
forum at issue. 146 The full court, like the panel before it, questioned
whether the university intended to open the forum to a segment of
the public. 147 Judge Cole identified several factors from the Hazelwood
decision that could be used to make this determination: school policy,
school officials' practices regarding the yearbook, the nature of the
property and its compatibility with free expression, and the context in
which the speech occurred. 148 Examining all of these factors, includ-
ing the publication's intended audience of young adults, the court
found that the yearbook was a limited public forum. 149
Because the court characterized the yearbook as a limited public
forum, the university could only impose reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on its publication (such as limiting when and where
the students could distribute the books). 199 Furthermore, strict scrutiny
review required that any content-based regulations must be narrowly
designed to serve a compelling state interest. , " The court stated that
total confiscation of the yearbook was not a reasonable time, place, or
' 4 ' Id. at 731 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
146 Sec id. (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144 Id. at 730-31 n.1 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 349,354.
146 See id. at 344; Kincaid I, 191 F.3d at 730-32 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
146 See Kincaid g 236 F.3d at 347-52.
147 Sec id. at 348-49.
146 See id. at 349-52.
149 See id.
166 Sec id. at 354 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
46 (1983)).
161 Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 354.
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manner regulation because the university's actions were based on the
yearbook's content, not the manner in which it was distributed.'" The
university's actions also were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest, as the school could have taken reasonable steps to ensure
the quality of the yearbook without wholly confiscating the final prod-
uct.'" Furthermore, the school did not provide an alternative forum for
similar expressive activity.' 64
 Thus, the court concluded that the univer-
sity officials had violated the students' First Amendment rights.'"
The court also stated, in dicta, that even if the yearbook were a
nonpublic forum, confiscation of the yearbook would violate the . stu-
dents' rights.'" Even under the reasonableness standard, the court
found that the university's actions were disproportionate to its stated
interests and therefore were not reasonable.'" Furthermore, the
court noted that total confiscation of the yearbook suggested an at-
tempt to suppress the students' viewpoint, which included the year-
book editor's choice of theme, selection of pictures, and expression of
opinions. 158
 The court concluded that under limited public forum or
nonpublic forum analysis, the university officials' actions violated the
First Arnendment.I 59
C. Application of Hazelwood to University Curricular Speech
In 2002, in Brown, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit applied Hazelwood to a university's restriction on
a student's speech.'" An academic committee of the University of
California at Santa Barbara approved Christopher Brown's master's
thesis in the spring of 1999. 161 Subsequent to the approval, Brown in-
serted a two-page section, entitled "Disacknowledgements," and at-





156 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 355.
I" See id. at 355-56 (applying the standard for a nonpublic forum under Perry, 460
U.S. at 46).
156
 See id. at 356.
155 See id.
leo See Brown, 308 F.3d at 947.
161
 Id. at 943.
162
 Id. Brown's original 'Disacknowledgements" section contained profane language
and identified several university administrators and other public officials as having hin-
dered Brown's graduate career. Id.
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to the thesis came to the attention of the thesis committee, which
notified Brown that it would not approve the amended thesis because
the "Disacknowledgements" did not meet publication standards. 163
Brown appealed the committee's decision through several university
channels and the school placed him on academic probation for ex-
ceeding the time limit for completing a master's degree.'" Eventually,
the university awarded Brown his degree in May 2000, but would not
add his thesis to the library archives because he refused to file the
originally approved version. 165
Brown initiated his lawsuit against several university officials in
June 2000. 166 In his complaint, Brown alleged that the university had
violated his First Amendment rights when the thesis committee failed
to approve the "Disacknowledgements" section of his thesis, when the
library refused to file his thesis in its archives, and when his master's
degree was withheld for over a year. 167
 The U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California granted summary judgment to the uni-
versity officials in an unpublished opinion and Brown appealed. 168
The Ninth Circuit panel subsequently affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion under Hazclwood's reasonableness standard.' 69
1. Judge Graber: Hazelwood Is Applicable
Because Brown's other claims followed from the thesis commit-
tee's decision not to approve the "Disacknowledgements" section, the
judges focused on whether this action violated Brown's First Amend-
ment rights. 170 ,Finding no precedent directly on point, Judge Graber,
writing for the panel, relied on the Hazelwood standard for reviewing
restrictions on student speech."' Applying this standard, Judge Gra-
ber concluded that the university .officials did not violate Brown's
rights because their actions were reasonable in light of their legiti-
163 Id. at 943-44. The university's Guide to Filing Theses and Dissertations included
general criteria for an optional "Dedication and/or Acknowledgments" section of a thesis.
Id. at 942. The thesis committee refused to approve the "Disacknowledgements" section
even after Brown removed all profanities. Id. at 943.
164 Id. at 944-45.
10 Brown, 308 F.3d at 945.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 945,947.
1" Id. at 946.
I" Id. at 954.
170 Sec Brown, 308 F.3d at 947.
171 Id.; see Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
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mate concerns for maintaining professional standards. 172
 Because the
university's thesis requirements were reasonable and pedagogically
appropriate, the university could withhold approval of a thesis that
did not meet those standards.'"
Judge Graber concluded that an academic thesis "is not a public
forum, limited or otherwise," and thus rejected any public forum
analysis. 174
 Nevertheless, Judge Graber used Hazelwood's test to bal-
ance the university's interest in controlling • its curriculum against
Brown's right to free speech.'" Brown's thesis was required for com-
pletion of his master's degree and thus could be viewed as part of the
curriculum.'" The thesis was designed to teach Brown how to re-
search and present a study within his academic specialty, so the re-
quirement that the thesis comply with professional standards was
pedagogically appropriate.'" Thus, the committee's decision to reject
the thesis served a legitimate objective.'"
Judge Graber recognized that the appropriate standard for review-
ing restrictions on students' speech at the university level remained an
open issue.'" Although acknowledging that the Sixth Circuit rejected
application of Hazelwood's test in Kincaid II, Judge Graber distinguished
that case because the university restricted extracurricular, as opposed to
curricular, speech.m Relying on previous distinctions between curricu-
lar and extracurricular speech in First Amendment cases, Judge Graber
reasoned that Hazelwood's test could be used to review university
officials' decisions regarding curricular speech, even if thit standard
had been rejected for students' extracurricular speech."'
To support her distinction between curricular and extracurricular
speech, Judge Graber reviewed a Sixth Circuit decision, Settle v. Dickson
177 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 952.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 954.
177
 See id. at 952.
178 1d.
177 Brown, 308 F.3d at 952.
ra Id.
"9 Id. at 949.
'a° See id.; Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 346 n.5.
181 See Bimini, 308 F.3d at 950 (citing Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 862 (1982)). In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School
District No. 26 v. Pico, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a local school board could not
remove books from the school library on the basis that the board members did not like the
ideas contained within the books. 457 U.S. at 872. The Court limited its holding to books
contained in the library for optional reading and did not reach the issue with regard to
textbooks or other books used in classroom teaching. Id. at 861-62.
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County School Board, as factually similar to Brown's case.'" Judge Graber
relied on the similarities between the curricular assignments in Brown
and Settle to conclude that the same standards apply in the high school
and graduate school environments. 183 In Settle, a ninth-grade student
argued that her First Amendment rights were violated when her
teacher refused to approve her topic for a class research paper. 184
 The
teacher approved the student's first topic, "Drama," and then the stu-
dent changed her topic to "The Life of Jesus Christ" without obtaining
the teacher's approval.' The Sixth Circuit noted that the Hazelwood
school newspaper was "a kind of open forum for students," and con-
cluded that student speech in the classroom could be restricted even
more than in an extracurricular forum. 1 N
Additionally, Judge Graber rejected Brown's argument that he
had a First Amendment right to express any viewpoint he chose in the
Acknowledgements section of his thesis. 187 Judge Graber concluded
that a university could require a student to write a paper from a par-
ticular viewpoint, even a viewpoint with which the student disagreed,
as long as this requirement was based on a legitimate pedagogical
purpose. 188 The thesis committee could thus require Brown to recog-
nize those who had made positive contributions to his education in
his Acknowledgements section, if he chose to include one, because
this requirement conformed to professional standards. 189
2. Judge Reinhardt: Hazelwood Is Not Applicable
Judge Stephen Reinhardt wrote a separate opinion rejecting the
application of the Hazelwood standard to student speech in the univer-
sity context. 190 Furthermore, Judge Reinhardt maintained that even
though the court applied the Hazelwood test, the case should have been
remanded because Brown raised genuine issues of material fact regard-
"4 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 948; Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (Gth
Cir. 1995) (holding that a teacher could limit speech in the classroom in the name of
learning," so long as restrictions on speech are not a pretext for punishing a student for a
particular viewpoint).
la! See Brown, 308 F.3d at 948-49.
1 B4 53 F.ad at 155.
188 Id. at 154.
186 Id. at 155.
187 Brown, 308 F.3d at 953.
188 Id.
188 Id. Although Brown did not have to include an Acknowledgements section in his
thesis, if he chose to do so, the committee could restrict the content of that section. Id.
190 See id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ing the reasonableness of the university's actions and the possibility that
the university impermissibly punished him for his viewpoint. 191
Judge Reinhardt maintained that the Ninth Circuit should not
adopt the legitimate pedagogical concerns test in future cases con-
cerning college students' speech because Hazelwood's deference to
school officials was inappropriate "in the adult world of college and
graduate students, an arena in which academiC freedom and vigorous
debate are supposed to flOurish." 192 Applying Hazelwood's deferential
analysis to the university setting could have a dangerous chilling effect
on student speech. 193
 Judge Reinhardt suggested that the U.S. Su-
preme Court based its reasoning in Hazelwood on the emotional im-
maturity of the newspaper's audience, a concern that would not apply
to university students. 194
 Furthermore, past U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions have recognized that college students are both more mature
than high school students and less likely to be influenced on contro-
versial topics. 195
 Just as college students are given greater legal rights
than high school students in many areas (such as voting), the same
principles extend to First Amendment rights.' 96
Finally, Judge Reinhardt rejected the argument that extracurricu-
lar speech can be distinguished from curricular speech because the
U.S. Supreme Court did not recognize this distinction in Hazdwood. 197
Instead, the Hazelwood Court considered the nature of the speech
(school-sponsored or personal) to determine the correct level of scru-
tiny, regardless of whether the expressive activity occurred in the
classroom. 198
 Arguing that curricular speech and extracurricular
speech, such as a student yearbook, are equally likely to be perceived
as bearing the imprimatur of the school, Judge Reinhardt found no
basis for distinguishing Brown's case from Kincaid ID" Thus, he pro-
See id. at 958, 960 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192
 Bimini, 308 F.3d at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193 Sec id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194 See id. at 961 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I" See id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (noting that lu[niversity students are, of course,
young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to
appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion.")).
196 See id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 271-73.
1" See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Brown, 308 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
199 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Kincaid 11, 236 F.3d at 349.
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posed several alternative methods for deciding the case, such as lim-
ited public forum analysis (requiring strict scrutiny) or adoption of an
intermediate level of scrutiny. 20D
W. HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT v. KUHLMEIER'S DEFERENCE IS
INAPPROPRIATE IN THE UNIVERSITY SETTING
In Brown v. Li, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
fronted the novel issue of the appropriate standard for reviewing the
university's acts regulating student speech in a curricular settinool B e
-cause the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed a public university's
regulation of a student's curricular speech, the Ninth Circuit looked to
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlineier for guidance. 202 Likewise, a panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied Hazelwood to
university officials' regulation of students' extra-curricular speech in
Kincaid v. Gibson, but this decision was subsequently overturned by the
en banc court. 203 The courts' decisions to apply the deferential Hazel-
wood standard in the university context fail to take into account the in-
herent differences between secondary and post-secondary education. 204
Future application of this mode of analysis could have detrimental ef-
fects on the rigor of university education, where individual thought and
free expression are particularly valued. 205
. A. Distinctions Between Secondary and Post-Secondary Education
Courts must consider the nature and purpose of the educational
environment when balancing the rights of students against the inter-
ests of the schoo1.206 The context in which speech occurs, such as the
university or high school campus, is an important factor in determin-
ing whether the state intended to create a forum for free expres-
sion. 207 The Sixth Circuit recognized the importance of individual
200 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"' See 308 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1488 (2003) (mem.).
333
 Id.; see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
403 Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 726 (6th Cir. 1999) (Kincaid 1), ith'g en bane granted
and vacated by 197 F.3d 828 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd and remanded en bane, 236 F.3d 342 (6th
Cir. 2001) (Kincaid II).
204 See infra notes 206-222 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences
between secondary and higher education.
200 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Catty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
"7 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 352.
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thought and unregulated speech at the post-secondary level when it
remarked, "[t]tle university is a special place for purposes of First
Amendment jurisprudence."" University administrators' suppression
of student speech could have a chilling effect on this valued form of
expression because students may hesitate to make statements that
could be censored."
In contrast, courts have placed greater limitations on elementary
and high school students' rights to free expression. 21 ° For example, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that teachers and students retain
significant rights under the First Amendment, but also acknowledged
that the school environment has "special characteristics." 211 Although
"[i] t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate," schools are also responsible for teaching children values
that are consistent with those of the community. 212 As a result, courts
are more likely to defer to school administrators' decisions regarding
the need to maintain order in the school and the appropriateness of
discussing sensitive issues in light of the children's age and maturity. 213
Even though high school students retain some First Amendment
rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that these rights
are not equivalent to those of adults. 214 For example, the government
cannot restrict an adult's controversial or offensive expressions in a
public place unless the state can demonstrate a compelling reason for
doing so.215 School officials, however, can prohibit the use of the exact
same speech during a high school assembly because a student's
speech rights are not equivalent to an adult's right to free expression
in a public place.216
Although courts recognize that schools have legitimate interests
in regulating student conduct, a problem arises when the student is
an adult (presumably in college) and wishes to exercise his or her
right to free expression.217
 Competing views of the role and purpose
2°8 Id.
209 See id. (citing Rosenberger s'. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835
(1995)).
210 see, e.g., Hazeh000d, 484 U.S. at 273.
211 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
212 Id.; see Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
213 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 274-75.





217 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 352.
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of the university underlie the debate over whether similar standards
should apply to First Amendment violations in the secondary and
post-secondary school contexts. 218 .In Brown, Judge Graber of the
Ninth Circuit maintained that an educational institution's interest in
limiting a student's speech to the parameters of an academic assign-
ment does not diminish as the student's age increases. 219 Judge Gra-
ber stated that the university's interest may even be more compelling
where there is a greater "need for academic discipline and editorial
rigor," such as in a master's thesis. 22° This contrasts with Judge Rein-
hardt's assertion in the same case that the university is an environ-
ment in which "academic freedom and vigorous debate are supposed
to flourish. "221 Courts should consider the nature of the university
learning environment as a significant,. if not determining, factor in
deciding whether to give deference to school officials' restrictions on
student speech.222
B. Extension of Viewpoint Discrimination to Public Universities
The recent holdings of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First,
Third, and Tenth Circuits regarding viewpoint discrimination raise an
additional concern over application of the Hazelwood standard to col-
leges and universities. 225 The Tenth Circuit, in Fleming v. Jefferson.
County School District R-1, concluded that viewpoint discrimination is
permissible based on the assumption that schools must make view-
point-based judgments in determining what messages should bear the
imprimatur of the schoo1, 224 Thus, a school can choose to permit stu-
dent speech that advocates against drug use or teenage sex without
being obligated to tolerate student speech that endorses the opposite
viewpoint. 225 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit panel in Brown rejected the
plaintiff's argument that he had a First Amendment right to express
215 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 951; id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
219 See id. at 951.
220 See id.
221 Id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
• 222 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 352.
225 See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926 (10th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003) (mem.); C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 1999),
reh'g en bane granted and vacated by 197 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd en bane by an equally di-
vided court, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993).
224 See 298 F.3d at 928.
225 Id.
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any viewpoint he chose in his thesis's Acknowledgments section. 226
The panel stated that under Hazelwood, a teacher may require a stu-
dent to complete a curricular assignment from any viewpoint, even
one with which the student disagrees, as long as the requirement
serves a legitimate pedagogical purpose.227 This reasoning suggests
that future courts may allow universities to regulate speech based on
the viewpoint expressed, 228
Viewpoint discrimination is not appropriate in the context of a
public university, where the free exchange of ideas and opposing
viewpoints is particularly valued. 229
 Under the Court's usual nonpublic
forum analysis, the government cannot regulate speech based on the
speaker's viewpoint even though content-based restrictions are per-
missible. 28° Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not specifically ad-
dress viewpoint discrimination in Hazelwood, the circuit courts have
relied on the Hazelwood majority's substantial deference to school
officials as a justification for allowing schools to regulate speech based
on viewpoint.231
 For example, in Fleming, the Tenth Circuit held that
Hazelwood does not require educators to enforce viewpoint neutrality
because they must make decisions concerning the appropriateness of
a speaker's message and the audience's sensitivity to controversial is-
sues. 232
 Because this level of deference to school officials is not appro-
priate at the university level, viewpoint discrimination also should not
be upheld in this context.233
V. ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS OP REVIEW
Courts have addressed restrictions on student speech in a variety
of contexts within the elementary and high school settings, but only a
few circuit courts have addressed this issue at the university leve1. 234
228 See 308 F.3d at 953.
227 Id.
228 See id.
229 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 352.
238 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see also
Kincaid 11, 236 F.3d at 356 (stating that, "in a traditional, limited, or nonpublic forum, state
officials may not expunge even 'garbage' if it represents a speaker's viewpoint").
231 See 484 U.S. at 273; Fleming, 298 F.3d at 928.
232 Fleming, 298 F.3d at 928.
288 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 356 (noting that the university's confiscation of the school
yearbook -smacks of viewpoint discrimination"); see also Brown, 308 F.3d at 965 (Reinhardt,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (raising question of material fact about
whether the university punished Brown for the viewpoint he sought to express).
284 See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F,3d 918, 926 (10th Cir.
2002) (high school case), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1110 (2003) (mem.); Brown s Li, 308 F.3d
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Judge Graber's application of the Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
standard in Brown. u Li is not binding for future cases because the two
judges who concurred in the decision followed different rationales." 5
Accordingly, this Part explores alternative standards for reviewing
speech regulations on college campuses. 256
Courts continue to struggle over the appropriate level of scrutiny
for First Amendment issues in the public university setting. 237 Different
First Amendment standards may be applicable depending on the con-
text in which the speech occurs on a university campus. 238 For example,
distinct standards may be applied when regulating the speech of an
agent of the university (such as a professor), a student, or a private in-
dividual who is using the university's facfiities. 259
 For regulations of stu-
dent speech, courts should adopt a framework that adequately protects
students' free speech rights against the state's interest in regulating
conduct within the schoo1. 24° Furthermore, courts should use height-
ened scrutiny when purported justifications for restrictions on speech
may be pretexts for impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 241
A. Revival ofTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District 's Material and Substantial Disruption Test
The material and substantial disruption test provides a viable
framework for reviewing alleged First Amendment violations on univer-
sity campuses.242 Under this standard, educators can maintain order on
school campuses while encouraging students to express opinions from
any viewpoini249 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict offers several advantages for analysis in the university context. 244
The Tinker Court did not limit its holding to classroom speech, so the
material and substantial disruption test may be applied to curricular
939, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (university case), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1488 (2003) (mem.); C.H.
v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 1999) (elementary school case), relig en bane granted and
vacated by 197 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd en banc by an equally divided court, 226 F.3d 198
(3d Cir. 2000).
235 See Brawn, 308 F.3d at 955-56 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
236 See infra notes 237-289 and accompanying text.
237 See, e.g., Brown, 308 F.3d at 947.
2i13 See id. at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233 See id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24° See id. at 963-64 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241 See Kincaid v Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 356 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Kincaid II).
242 Sec Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
243 See id. at 506-07.
241 Sec id.
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and extracurricular activities on college campuses. 245 The Tinker stan-
dard also allows school officials to regulate speech that invades the
rights of other students, an interest that the Hazelwood court recognized
as a legitimate concern for school authorities. 24
 An additional advan-
tage of the material and substantial disruption test is that it does not
rely on complex public forum analysis. 247
 Regardless of the forum in
which speech occurs, university officials may adopt the Tinker test to
maintain order while preserving students' First Amendment rights. 245
What constitutes "material and substantial disruption" may be
different in the university, as opposed to the secondary school, set-
ting. 249
 Given the significant differences in school practices and
policies on college campuses, a court could conclude that conduct
which may disrupt teaching in a high school would not be disruptive
in the college environment. 250 In Healy v. James, the Court adopted
the Tinker standard as an appropriate framework for analyzing col-
lege students' First Amendment right to form a student organization
on campus. 25t The Court required school administrators to demon-
strate that the students were likely to create a disruption on campus
by violating reasonable campus rules, interrupting classes, or sub-
stantially interfering with the rights of other students. 252
 Likewise,
future courts applying the material and substantial disruption test
should consider the special characteristics of the university setting
when deciding whether the threat of substantial disruption warrants
censorship of student speech. 255
Although Tinker has not been explicitly overruled, the viability of
its holding has been questioned. 254
 The U.S. Supreme Court declined
to apply the Tinker test in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, reasoning
that offensive and sexually explicit speech invades the rights of other
2'6 See id. at 512-13.
246 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988); Tinker, 393 U.S. at
508.
247 See infra notes 268-271 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disadvantages
of public forum analysis.
248
 See 393 U.S. at 506.
249 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.




264 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the School-
house Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 529 (2000) (citing Baxter v. Vigo
County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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students.255 Likewise, in Hazelwood, the Court created a new category of
speech that schools may regulate as long as the state has legitimate rea-
sons for doing so. 256 Thus, in the high school context, Tinker only ap-
plies to "pure" student speech, which the public would not perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the schoo1. 257 Although Tinker's applicability is
narrow in the secondary school context, the state has a less significant
interest in protecting students from offensive speech in the university
setting, where students are more mature. 258
B. Standards Based on. Context: Public Forum Analysis
Public forum analysis requires courts to consider the context in
which speech occurs as well as the government's purpose in creating
an expressive forum.25° To protect a student's rights, a court could
find, as did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Kincaid
v. Gibson ("Kincaid II"), that the student's speech occurred in a limited
public forum, thus triggering strict scrutiny. 260 Under this standard,
content-based regulations of speech must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest."' In Kincaid II, the Sixth Circuit
viewed the public university setting, along with school policies, the
school administration's practices, and the forum's compatibility with
expressive activity, as a significant factor in determining that the
school intended to create a limited public forum. 262 Future courts
should rely on this reasoning to find that all or most aspects of a pub-
lic university campus are designated public fora for student speech. 263
Alternatively, a court could adopt an intermediate level of scru-
tiny for acts restricting student speech on university campuses. 2° Un-
255 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No, 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986).
256 See 484 U.S. at.270-71.
257 See id.; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 	 '
256 See, e.g., IGncaid II, 236 F.3d at 352. In Hosty u Carter, a panel of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit similarly recognized that the significant differences between
universities and high schools require broader protection of First Amendment rights in higher
education. See 325 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2003), vacated and rrkgen bane granted, No. 01.4155
(7th Cir. June 25, 2003).
259 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
26° 236 F.3d at 349: see Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
261 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
262 See 236 F.3d at 352.
265 See id.
264 See Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny
to genderbased classifications at a public university under equal protection analysis)).
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der intermediate scrutiny, a university would have to demonstrate that
its regulation of student speech is substantially related to an impor-
tant state interest. 265
 This standard would provide more protection for
student speech than Hazelwood, while giving more deference to uni-
versity officials than strict scrutiny under limited public forum analy-
sis. 266
 Courts may find that intermediate scrutiny provides a more ap-
propriate balance between the government's and students' interests
than the current public forum standards. 267
Public forum analysis also has several limitations, including the
problem of defining what aspect of the school setting constitutes a
"forum.”268
 A court may define the scope of a forum broadly (such as
the entire university campus) or narrowly (such as the student news-
paper), potentially resulting in different outcomes. 269
 For example,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel rejected public
forum analysis in Brown because it could not determine what consti-
tuted a forum for free speech in that case. 270 Although the panel re-
jected the notion that a master's thesis could be considered any type
of forum for speech, it relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in
Hazelwood, which was rooted in public forum doctrine. 271
C. Standards Based on Age: The "Age
-of-Majority" Test
A final possible approach is an "age-of-majority" test, which would
create two different standards for reviewing students' First Amend-
ment rights: one for minors and one for adults. 272 The Sixth Circuit
adopted a similar approach when it considered the age. of the stu-
dents, among other -factors, in characterizing the yearbook as a lim-
ited public forum in Kincaid H—thus rendering Hazelwood inapplica-
ble.2" The advantage of this approach is that it elevates college stu-
dents' free speech rights to those of adults, rather than equating them
with high school students. 274
265 See id. (Reinhardt,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
266 See id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
267 See id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
266 See id. at 954 n.5; Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 348.
269
 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 352.
279 308 F.3d at 954 n.5.
271 See id. at 952,954 n.5; see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70.
272
	 Lisby, supra note 21, at 155-56.
275
	 Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 352 (stating "bin addition to the nature of the university
setting, we find it relevant that the editors of The Thorobred and its readers are likely to be
young adult?).
274 See Lisby, supra note 21, at 155-56.
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Although this approach provides a clear, bright-line test based on
age, the age-of-majority test also has significant limitations that may
lead courts to reject it based on the facts of a particular case. 275 Al-
though many students have reached the age of eighteen when they
begin college, some have not and would still be considered minors.
Using twenty-one as the age of majority would prove even more trou-
blesome, as many university students are under this age.276 The Hazel-
wood Court focused on the potential impact of controversial speech
on an immature audience, not the speaker's age or maturity.277
 Like-
wise, a court could apply the deferential high school standard to uni-
versity regulations of speech in a setting where some members of the
audience' fall under the age of majority. 278 Thus, the age-of-majority
test may not provide any greater protection of university students'
rights than the Hazelwood standard. 27°
D. Framework for Future Analysis
Until the U.S. Supreme Court decides- whether Hazelwood should
apply in the university context, courts should use a framework of
analysis that preserves college students' full First Amendment rights
to free speech and expression. 28° Finding that the university has cre-
ated a limited public forum preserves students' free speech rights by
subjecting regulations of speech to strict scrutiny. 281 Even in the case
of a nonpublic forum, a court should find that the students' speech
does not bear the imprimatur of the school if university officials have
taken steps to distance the school from students' personal speech. 282
Courts should also recognize that the state's interest in protecting
students from sensitive issues is significantly less compelling at the
university leve1. 283 Thus, Hazelwood's deferential standard is not ap-
propriate in the university context. 284 Instead, courts should apply the
material and substantial disruption test to review restrictions on stu-
dent speech when the university has not created a public forum. 285
272 See id. at 155.
276 See id.
277 Sec 484 U.S. at 271.
278 See id.
272 See id.
222 See id. at 273 n.7; Healy, 408 U.S. at 194.
281 See Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 354.
282 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
283 See id. at 272.
284 See id.
222 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13.
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Tinker's standard provides the most appropriate balance between
the competing interests of the university and the student because it
requires university officials to refrain from censoring student speech
unless there is evidence that substantial disruption is likely to oc-
cur. 286 In addition to adopting guidelines that follow the Tinker
framework, university officials can take other measures to maintain
order and avoid disruption on university campuses without suppress-
ing students' speech. 287 For example, students who threaten or cause
disruption can be disciplined under university regulations that meet
due process requirements, eliminating the need for school officials to
restrict student speech in order to avoid potential disruption. 288 Fo-
cusing on the disruption created by students' speech provides an ap-
propriate balance between the university's interests in maintaining
an environment conducive to education and the students' needs to
express their views freely. 289
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment guarantees of free speech and expression
are vital to university education. Courts must balance these significant
constitutional interests against the need for university officials to cre-
ate an environment in which learning can occur. Although the
school's interest in regulating student conduct is significant, university
officials should not be given the same level of deference as elemen-
tary or secondary school officials when regulating student speech. At
least two panels of circuit court judges have applied Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlnwier's deferential reasonableness standard, which does
not adequately protect university students' free speech rights, to the
collegiate setting. Until the U.S. Supreme Court provides an alterna-
tive standard of review for university regulations of student speech,
courts should rely on the material and substantial disruption test as a
framework for balancing these competing interests.
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